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China’s oil products demand growth 
over the past several years has been 
dominated by the light end of the barrel. 
In 2015, gasoline and natural gas liquids 
(NGLs) together accounted for 53% of net 
incremental oil products demand growth 
in China (Figure 1).1 By 2016, light ends 
accounted for such a significant proportion 
of this demand that without gasoline 
and NGL demand growth, oil product 
consumption in China would have actually 
declined, as consumption of diesel fuel and 
residual fuel oil fell year-on-year. 
 As China’s demand for light oil products 
continues to drive incremental consumption 
growth, an interesting theme is becoming 
apparent: commodities that are framed as 
“oil products” are increasingly not actually 
made from crude oil. The methanol and 
derivatives being blended into the Chinese 
gasoline supply generally come from coal, 
while a meaningful portion of NGLs entering 
China are produced in US shale plays and 
never see the inside of a refinery distillation 
tower.2 This could pose an emerging 
demand-side risk for crude oil prices, since 
molecules of methanol and its derivatives—
along with shale-sourced NGLs—are 
effectively displacing compounds formerly 
created by refining crude oil.
METHANOL BLENDING AND 
DERIVATIVES INJECTING COAL INTO 
CHINA’S GASOLINE POOL
While the lion’s share of China gasoline 
supply comes from refining crude oil, an 
increasing proportion effectively comes from 
China’s coalfields in the forms of methanol 
and chemicals produced using methanol as 
a feedstock. Indeed, data from Argus Media 
suggest that more than 400,000 barrels per 
day (bpd) of China’s gasoline pool—which 
SOURCES  International Energy Agency, author’s own analysis
FIGURE 1 — CHINA OIL PRODUCTS DEMAND GROWTH BY CATEGORY 
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 The rise in methanol blending appears 
primarily driven by (1) increasing octane 
ratings and decreasing gasoline sulfur 
content to meet new national quality 
standards in a cost-effective manner, (2) 
reducing oil import needs, and (3) providing 
an additional domestic industrial value-
added activity by sustaining coal demand, 
as apparent consumption declines at the 
national level. 
 Regulatory changes are also facilitating 
increased use of methanol in gasoline across 
China. Sixteen Chinese provinces have 
issued local standards on methanol-blended 
fuel since 2004, the bulk of which focus 
on lower concentration blends such as M10 
and M15 (i.e., 10% and 15% methanol by 
volume, respectively).5 The provinces with 
local methanol rules now include Fujian, 
Jiangsu, Liaoning, Shandong, Shanghai, 
and Zhejiang. These provinces contain 
roughly 30% of China’s entire private 
car fleet and are located on the coast, 
where they can potentially access price-
advantaged methanol imports made from 
low-cost U.S. natural gas. Inland, together 
with those in Sichuan, drivers in the “coal 
patch” of Shanxi, Shaanxi, Ningxia, Gansu, 
and Qinghai own roughly 16 million private 
passenger cars. In all of these provinces, 
either methanol-gasoline blends are already 
for sale, or policymakers are seriously 
considering incorporating methanol into the 
local gasoline pool.
 Data from Argus Media suggest that in 
2016, roughly 200,000 bpd of methanol 
were blended into the Chinese gasoline 
stream, with another 200,000 bpd of 
methanol derivatives such as MTBE also 
being incorporated.6 As such, if we assume 
a baseline Chinese gasoline demand 
of approximately 3 million bpd, actual 
methanol accounts for 6–7% of the gasoline 
pool, with methanol derivatives contributing 
another 7% to total pool volume. As such, 
on a national level, the M15 era is already 
essentially here in the Chinese gasoline 
market, albeit in a derivative sense. 
 Moving forward, it is unclear whether 
the percentage of MTBE in Chinese gasoline 
will remain at current levels, if more of the 
Chinese population begins to have the same 
is currently about 3 million bpd in size—
comes from methanol and its derivatives.3 
Expressed in share terms, this means at 
least 15% of the country’s gasoline comes 
from methanol and methanol-derived 
compounds such as methyl tertiary butyl 
ether (MTBE) (Figure 2). 
 Methanol’s growing role as a gasoline 
constituent in China raises questions about 
possible new cross-commodity price 
relationships, since two-thirds of China’s 
domestic methanol production—which 
dominates overall supply—comes from 
plants using coal feedstock. The remainder 
comes from facilities that use coking gas 
(17% of total capacity) and natural gas (15% 
of total capacity) as feedstock.4
SOURCES  Argus Media, US Energy Information Agency (EIA), Bloomberg, author’s own analysis
FIGURE 2 — METHANOL AND DERIVATIVES OFFER COST ADVANTAGES 
TO GASOLINE BLENDERS IN CHINA, NOW ACCOUNT FOR APPROX. 15% 
OF GASOLINE POOL
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environmental and health concerns about 
MTBE that led to it being banned from the 
US market in 2006.7 If MTBE was to fall out 
of favor and be substituted with methanol—
thus keeping the proportion of methanol 
and its derivatives in the gasoline pool closer 
to the current level—the crude oil demand 
displacement effect would likely be relatively 
muted. If, on the other hand, MTBE remains 
heavily used and blenders inject a large 
volume of neat methanol into the Chinese 
gasoline system, much more crude oil use 
could be displaced—especially if gasoline 
demand growth slows or stalls. 
 Two key factors will greatly influence 
the ultimate answer to these questions: 
First, how much more methanol can the 
Chinese car fleet accommodate without 
inducing maintenance problems that 
could prompt a driver backlash against 
higher-concentration gasoline-methanol 
fuel formulas? And second, can the areas 
in China with low-cost coal feedstocks—
which are also often afflicted by water 
shortages—muster sufficient water 
supplies to accommodate additional 
methanol production? From a raw materials 
perspective, China’s coal reserves are more 
than capable of supporting a significant 
increase in methanol production, but 
water intensity poses tougher challenges. 
Researchers in China estimate that 
producing one tonne of methanol from 
coal requires 8.3 tonnes of water.8 In other 
words, it takes about 6.6 barrels of water to 
produce one barrel of methanol from coal.9
 In contrast, data from Valero—the 
largest independent U.S. refiner and operator 
of one of the world’s most complex set of 
refining assets—show that processing a 
barrel of crude oil requires 0.4 to 1.2 barrels 
of water, depending on refinery complexity 
and on-site hydrogen production activity.10 
Sinopec, which has the largest and arguably 
most sophisticated refinery footprint in 
China, refined 236 million tonnes of crude 
oil (approximately 4.72 million bpd) and 
produced 56.36 million tonnes of gasoline 
(approximately 1.30 million bpd) in 2016.11 
As such, it can reasonably be assumed 
that China’s large refiners process 4 barrels 
of crude oil for every barrel of finished 
gasoline produced. Using the Valero data, 
this suggests each barrel of gasoline in 
China likely requires in the neighborhood 
of 5 barrels of water to produce. This is 
approximately 25% less water per unit of 
fuel than the amounts coal-based methanol 
plants will typically use. 
 China’s largest refineries tend to be 
located in water-abundant coastal areas, 
whereas the central Chinese coal patch 
(a likely location for methanol producers 
seeking proximity to coal feedstock) 
is generally much drier. If the Chinese 
leadership seeks to promote the use of 
methanol but reduce competition for 
scarce inland water resources, one possible 
solution would entail building coal-to-
methanol plants in wetter coastal areas and 
transporting the coal to those plants, since 
water is the greater limiting factor. To boot, 
with the exception of Sichuan, China’s largest 
gasoline markets are located in the populous, 
wealthier coastal zones such as Guangdong, 
Jiangsu, Shandong, and Zhejiang.
 
CHINA’S PETROCHEMICAL MAKERS 
TAP U.S. SHALE BOOM
In a twist that vividly illustrates how the 
US shale boom has reshaped global NGL 
and gas procurement strategies, the United 
States now accounts for a significant 
portion of China’s liquefied petroleum gas 
(LPG) imports, sometimes exceeding 40% 
of the country’s total imports in a given 
month (Figure 3). Much of the country’s LPG 
supply used to come from domestic refinery 
operations and was derived from crude oil. 
 LPG supplies from the US, however, 
come directly or indirectly from shale plays 
and thus bypass the refinery. Large-scale 
exports of LPG from the US only became 
possible with the advent of shale gas 
production. This means US NGL producers 
across plays such as the Marcellus, Utica, 
and Permian now effectively underwrite 
a significant portion of China’s imported 
petrochemical feedstock, as well as some 
degree of gasoline-blending components.12 
And the entire process happens with the 
exported hydrocarbons bypassing the 
distillation towers of a traditional oil refinery.
As China’s demand 
for light oil products 
continues to 
drive incremental 
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STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS
Oil producers—whether in Riyadh, Moscow, 
or the Permian Basin—should take stock of 
how China’s growing use of “oil products” 
that do not actually come from crude oil and 
instead bypass the refinery may translate 
into effective reductions in demand and 
prices for the crude oil they produce.
 There is an increasing risk that 
petroleum products that bypass the 
refinery may coincide with political factors 
to drive China’s crude oil demand toward 
the low-demand scenario the author 
posited in a previous paper published in 
September 2016: average annual demand 
growth of 1.9% between 2016 and 2020.15 
As expressed in that study, “China has 
simultaneously become a core driver of 
global oil demand growth while also fueling 
this growth through the construction of 
a debt-based, increasingly unsustainable 
economic structure.”16 If Chinese drivers fill 
their tanks with more methanol and Chinese 
petrochemical plants use more shale-
sourced NGLs, global benchmark oil prices 
could be trapped between $45 and $55 
for at least 24 months to come, because 
no other consumer country can currently 
deliver consistent incremental crude oil 
demand growth on the same scale as China.
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